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URING the survey period, the Texas appellate courts handed down
numerous decisions construing various rules of evidence. This is the
first survey period in which a substantial number of decisions inter-
preted the Texas Rules of Evidence because it has taken this long for cases
tried after the effective date of the rules' to work their way through the
appellate courts of Texas.
The cases of greatest significance arose in the following substantive areas:
1) Article I-General Provisions; 2) Article II-Judicial Notice; 3) Burden
of Proof, Presumptions, and Inferences; 4) Article IV-Relevancy and Its
Limits; 5) Article V-Privileges; 6) Article VI-Witnesses; 7) Article VII-
Opinions and Expert Testimony; (8) Article VIII-Hearsay; (9) Article
IX-Authentication and Identification; (10) Article X-Contents of Writ-
ings, Recordings, and Photographs; and (11) Parol Evidence.
I. ARTICLE I-GENERAL PROVISIONS
Article I of the Texas Rules of Evidence contains many important sub-
stantive provisions. 2 Texas Rule of Evidence 103(a)(1) provides that a
timely motion to strike or objection must appear in the record as a condition
for an attack on an evidentiary ruling on appeal. 3 This changes prior Texas
practice.4 In City ofAustin v. Avenue Corp.5 the Austin court of appeals did
not allow the appellant to attack on appeal the method of proof regarding
lost profits, explaining that because no objection was made to the evidence
when offered, error was not preserved under Texas Rule of Evidence 103.6
The Texas Supreme Court reversed on other grounds, yet disagreed with the
Austin court, holding that the city's filing of a motion for judgment n.o.v.
and a motion for new trial alleging the evidence was legally insufficient to
support the damage judgment was sufficient to preserve the point on appeal. 7
In Foster v. Bailey8 the appellant was not allowed to cross-examine the
* J.D., University of Texas. Attorney at Law, Fulbright & Jaworski, Houston, Texas.
1. Adopted by the Supreme Court of Texas effective September 1, 1983.
2. TEX. R. EvID. art I.
3. Id. 103(a)(1).
4. Unobjected to hearsay is no longer denied probative value. Id. 802.
5. 685 S.W.2d 453 (Tex. App.-Austin 1985), rev'd, 94 Tex. S. Ct. J. 171 (Jan. 25, 1986).
6. Id. at 455.
7. 29 Tex. S. Ct. J. at 172.
8. 691 S.W.2d 801 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, no writ).
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appellee, a plaintiff claiming damages for chemical bums to her scalp re-
ceived during a visit to the appellant's beauty shop. The appellant's question
whether the plaintiff tried to change her hair color after leaving the beauty
shop was disallowed by the trial court because no evidence supported it.
The appellant argued that because proximate cause was a disputed issue in
this negligence case, no predicate was required to support this line of ques-
tioning. The Houston court of appeals agreed.9 Furthermore, because the
right to cross-examine the sole adverse party on an ultimate disputed issue
does not depend upon a showing that the cross-examination will be success-
ful, error was not waived by the appellant's failure to make an offer of proof
under Texas Rule of Evidence 103(a)(2).10
II. ARTICLE II-JUDICIAL NOTICE
Judicial notice is now governed by article II of the Texas Rules of Evi-
dence. II Texas Rule of Evidence 201,12 governing judicial notice of adjudica-
tive facts, is a verbatim adoption of Federal Rules of Evidence 20113 and
basically does not alter prior Texas practice. Texas Rule of Evidence 201
defines the facts of which a court may properly take judicial notice. 14 The
rule also prescribes when the taking of judicial notice is discretionary or
mandatory, the timing of taking a judicial notice, and the accompanying
instructions to the jury.15 Other rules in article II govern the determination
of laws of other states 16 and of foreign countries. 17 Prior to Texas Rule of
Evidence 203, Texas courts refused to take judicial notice of foreign laws. 18
In San Benito Bank & Trust Co. v. Rio Grande Music Co., 19 decided during
the survey period but tried prior to the effective date of the rules, the Corpus
Christi court of appeals refused to take judicial notice of the law of Mexico
and declined to apply Texas Rule of Evidence 203 retroactively. 20
During the survey period, Texas Rule of Evidence 204 was added, permit-
ting judicial notice of Texas city and county ordinances, the contents of the
Texas Register, and the codified rules of the agencies published in the Ad-
ministrative Code. 21 A pre-rules case that would have been decided differ-
9. Id. at 803.
10. Id.; see TEX. R. EVID. 103(a)(2).
11. TEX. R. EvID. art. II.
12. Id. 201.
13. FED. R. EvID. 201.
14. TEX. R. EVID. 201. A fact proper for judicial notice "must be one not subject to
reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of
the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose




18. Franklin v. Smalldridge, 616 S.W.2d 655, 657 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1981, no
writ).
19. 686 S.W.2d 635 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
20. Id. at 639 n. 1.
21. TEX. R. EVID. 204.
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ently under rule 204, Estate of Murphy v. McCall,22 refused to notice
judicially a city ordinance. 23 The court explained that a city ordinance had
to be proved just like any other fact.24
During the survey period the appellate courts of Texas considered the
bounds of the proper subject matter for judicial notice. The Supreme Court
of Texas ruled that Texas courts are required to take judicial notice of the
public statutes of the state.25 The courts of appeals have held many matters
proper for judicial notice: that the present value of the discount rate was a
certain rate;26 that the city of Garland held a municipal election on January
21, 1984;27 that the contents of the State Register constituted prima facie
evidence of the text of documents published therein and that those docu-
ments were in effect on and after the date of notation;28 and that prior to the
effective date of the amended venue statute, far too many appeals were taken
on venue questions, resulting in needless delay. 29 Subjects held improper for
judicial notice were the correlation of minimum stopping distance with
speed, 30 the location of a particular subdivision mentioned in a contract to
purchase real property,3 1 and the local rules of the district courts absent a
showing that the local rules have been filed with the Supreme Court of
Texas. 32 One court incorrectly held that the reasonableness of attorneys'
fees was not a proper subject for judicial notice. 33
Texas Rule of Evidence 202 provides that a party requesting the taking of
judicial notice of the law of a foreign state must furnish the court with "suffi-
cient information to enable it properly to comply with the request." '34 This
rule does not require that the judge receive an actual copy of the foreign
22. 678 S.W.2d 530 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
23. Id. at 532.
24. Id.
25. Kish v. Van Note, 692 S.W.2d 463, 467 (Tex. 1985); see Prairie View A & M Univ. v.
Thomas, 684 S.W.2d 169, 170 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (courts
of appeals must take judicial notice of the public laws of the state).
26. Taylor Publishing Co. v. Systems Mktg., Inc., 686 S.W.2d 213, 217 (Tex. App.-
Dallas 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
27. City of Garland v. Louton, 683 S.W.2d 725, 726 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984), rev'd on
other grounds, 691 S.W.2d 603, 605 (Tex. 1985).
28. Mullinax, Wells, Baab & Cloutman v. Sage, 692 S.W.2d 533, 536 (Tex. App.-Dallas
1985, writ refd n.r.e.).
29. Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Blackstock, 691 S.W.2d 15, 16 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1985,
no writ).
30. Eikel v. Corry, 687 S.W.2d 488, 489 (Tex. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1985, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
31. Garner v. Redeaux, 678 S.W.2d 124, 127 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984,
writ ref'd n.r.e.). The court held that the location of the addition was not a matter of common
knowledge in the community and, therefore, was an improper subject for judicial notice. Id.
Under TEX. R. EvID. 201(b)(2) this opinion would be in error because the location of the
addition is "capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy
cannot be reasonably questioned" as stated by that rule. Id.
32. Chow v. Dole, 677 S.W.2d 220, 221 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, no writ).
33. Palmer v. Liles, 677 S.W.2d 661, 666 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, writ ref'd
n.r.e.). Where the court determines the issue of attorneys' fees, "the court may in its discretion
take judicial knowledge of the usual and customary fees in such matters . TEX. CIV.
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 38.004 (Vernon Pam. 1986).
34. TEX. R. EvID. 202.
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statute as a prerequisite to taking judicial notice. 35
Texas Rule of Evidence 201 (f) provides that judicial notice may be taken
at any stage of the proceeding. 36 This rule, like the common law,3 7 allows
judicial notice to be taken on appeal. In a case in which the jurisdiction of
the trial judge was challenged on appeal, one court took judicial notice that
the presiding trial judge was a retired district court judge who timely filed an
election to continue in his judicialy capacity. 38 In another case, the San
Antonio court of appeals incorrectly refused to take judicial notice of the
Railroad Commission's actions because the trial court did not have the op-
portunity to examine and take into consideration these actions. 39 If a fact is
not subject to "reasonable dispute,"'4 whether the trial court had an oppor-
tunity to consider the fact should not matter. Additionally, the Texas Rules
of Evidence provides that judicial notice is mandatory 41 and may be taken at
any state of the proceeding. 42
III. BURDEN OF PROOF, PRESUMPTIONS, AND INFERENCES
Article III of the Federal Rules of Evidence governs presumptions. 43 Be-
cause the Texas Rules of Evidence contain no article III, the law of pre-
sumptions continues to be governed by Texas common law.
Presumptions and inferences are sometimes merely assumptions of facts
that have not been rebutted. 44 The Fifth Circuit explained in Simpson v.
Home Petroleum Corp.4 5 that although a presumption shifts the burden of
going forward with the evidence, it does not shift the burden of persuasion. 46
In City of Houston v. Jones47 a Houston court of appeals held that the bur-
den of proof on a statutory exception rests on the party seeking to benefit
from the exception. 48
Although facts may be established circumstantially, the circumstances
themselves must be shown by direct evidence; circumstances cannot be in-
ferred from other circumstances, nor can a presumption of fact rest upon a
fact presumed. 49 Stacking inferences to reach an ultimate conclusion is not
35. Cal Growers, Inc. v. Palmer Warehouse & Transfer Co., 687 S.W.2d 384, 386 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, no writ).
36. TEX. R. EVID. 201(0.
37. See, e.g., Continental Oil Co. v. Simpson, 604 S.W.2d 530, 535 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Amarillo 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Vehlsing, Inc. v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 563 S.W.2d 669, 674
(Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1978, no writ).
38. Olivares v. State, 693 S.W.2d 486, 489 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, writ dism'd).
39. Duderstadt Surveyors Supply, Inc. v. Alamo Express, Inc., 686 S.W.2d 351, 354 (Tex.
App.-San Antonio 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
40. TEX. R. EvID. 201(b) requires a reasonable dispute.
41. Id. 201(d).
42. Id. 201(0.
43. FED. R. EVID. art. III.
44. See generally 1 R. RAY, TEXAS PRACTICE, LAW OF EVIDENCE §§ 51-56 (3d ed. 1980)
(classification of presumptions).
45. 770 F.2d 499 (5th Cir. 1985).
46. Id. at 505.
47. 679 S.W.2d 557 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ).
48. Id. at 559.




During the survey period the appellate courts of Texas articulated numer-
ous varied presumptions. When parties enter into a contract, the law
presumes that they intend the consequences of the contract's performance.5
A presumption exists that governmental authorities will discharge their du-
ties according to law.52 People are assumed to love life and avoid danger,
and in order to establish contributory negligence on the part of the deceased
in a wrongful death action, some evidence is necessary to overcome the pre-
sumption that the deceased exercised ordinary care for her own safety. 53
When a product has no warning a presumption exists that the user would
have read and heeded a proper warning had one been given. 54 The law
presumes that property acquired during marriage is part of the community
estate, and only clear and convincing or clear and satisfactory proof identify-
ing and tracing the claimed property can overcome this presumption.5 5 A
letter, properly addressed, stamped, and mailed, gives rise to a rebuttable
presumption that the addressee duly received the letter.56 This presumption
is rebuttable by actual evidence of nondelivery to the addressee. 57 When so
rebutted, facts underlying the presumption remain for consideration by the
trier of fact. 58 An agency relationship shown to have once existed is ordina-
rily presumed to continue. 59 In civil cases a test showing blood alcohol con-
tent of 0.119 does not raise a presumption of intoxication. 60 A presumption
that foreign law is the same as the law of the State of Texas cannot be used
to overthrow the presumed validity of the judgment of a sister state.6'
Antonio 1985), rev'd, 29 Tex. S. Ct. J. 152 (Jan. 18, 1986). Without discussing presumptions,
the supreme court explained that the court of appeals erred in remanding on a point not pre-
served on appeal. 29 Tex. S. Ct. J. at 153.
50. Nagy v. First Nat'l Gunn Banque Corp., 684 S.W.2d 114, 117 (Tex. App-Dallas
1984, writ refd n.r.e.).
51. Curry Auto Leasing, Inc. v. Byrd, 683 S.W.2d 109, 112 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, no
writ).
52. Charles Schreiner Bank v. Kerrville Indep. School Dist., 683 S.W.2d 466, 472 (Tex.
App.-San Antonio 1984, no writ).
53. Cavnar v. Quality Control Parking, Inc., 678 S.W.2d 548, 553 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.) 1984), rev'd on other grounds, 696 S.W.2d 549, 556 (Tex. 1985).
54. Howard v. Faberge, Inc., 679 S.W.2d 644, 650 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1984,
writ refd n.r.e.).
55. Whorral v. Whorral, 691 S.W.2d 32, 35 (Tex. App.-Austin 1985, writ dism'd).
56. Jim Walter Homes, Inc. v. Valencia, 679 S.W.2d 29, 35 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
1984), modified on other grounds, 690 S.W.2d 239, 242 (Tex. 1985).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Carroll Instrument Co. v. BWB Controls, Inc., 677 S.W.2d 654, 659 (Tex. App.-
Houston [lst Dist.] 1984, no writ).
60. See Ford Motor Co. v. Pool, 688 S.W.2d 879, 883 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1985),
rev'd, 29 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 204 (Feb. 12, 1986). The supreme court wrote that the court of
appeals erred in giving presumptive weight to the blood alcohol test because the DWI statute
in effect at the time of the accident did not provide for a presumption of intoxication in civil
actions. 29 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 205.
61. McFadden v. Farmers & Merchants Bank, 689 S.W.2d 330, 332 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 1985, no writ).
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IV. ARTICLE IV-RELEVANCY AND ITS LIMITS
Article IV of the Texas Rules of Evidence specifically governs relevancy
and its limits. 62 During the survey period, Texas Rule of Evidence 401, the
test of relevancy, was amended to make it identical to Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 401.63 The other rules contained in article IV did not change from
those originally adopted.
Certain of the Texas Rules of Evidence substantially liberalize the com-
mon law concept of relevant evidence. Texas Rule of Evidence 40564 allows
a witness's opinion testimony to prove character. Prior to the adoption of
the rules, character could be proven only by reputation. 65 Texas Rule of
Evidence 40666 also departs from prior Texas practice67 in that it allows
evidence of habit or the routine practice of an organization to prove conduct
on a particular occasion irrespective of the presence of eye witnesses. One of
the most controversial of all the Texas Rules of Evidence is rule 407, which
allows evidence of subsequent remedial measures in products liability cases,
but not in negligence cases. 68
Texas Rule of Evidence 403 provides for the exclusion of relevant evi-
dence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of un-
fair prejudice, confusion of the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 69 Two cases decided during
the survey period interpreted rule 403. In Perez v. Baker Packers70 a Hous-
ton court of appeals affirmed the admission of a physician's testimony, on
cross examination, that he suspected that the plaintiff's wound was self-in-
flicted. 71 The court explained that the doctor was quick to point out that his
observations were merely suspicions, and that the plaintiff-appellant had am-
ple opportunity to explore the testimony on redirect to diminish if not elimi-
nate any damaging effects. As a result, the court could not hold that the
trial court's balancing test, weighing the probative value of the evidence
against its prejudicial nature, was incorrect. 72 In Ford Motor Co. v. Pool73
the Texas Supreme Court found harmless error in the trial court's exclusion
of evidence that the plaintiff had engaged in violent conduct towards his
former wife, that she had placed him under a peace bond on two occasions,
that the plaintiff had filed for a divorce from his wife, that his wife had
sought a restraining order against the plaintiff's mother from interfering with
their marriage, and that the plaintiff and his wife were separated at time of
62. TEX. R. EviD. art. IV.
63. Id. 401; see FED. R. EvID. 401.
64. TEX R. EvID. 405.
65. See generally 2 R. RAY, supra note 44, § 1491 (use of reputation to prove character).
66. TEX. R. EvID. 406.
67. See generally 2 R. RAY, supra note 36, § 1511 (discussing the early use of habit and
custom to establish probative value).
68. TEX. R. EVID. 407.
69. Id. at 403.
70. 694 S.W.2d 138 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, writ ref d n.r.e.).
71. Id. at 143.
72. Id. at 140-41.
73. 29 Tex. S. Ct. J. 204, 208-09 (Feb. 15, 1986).
[Vol. 40
EVIDENCE
trial. The court explained that the excluded evidence was either cumulative
or irrelevant. 7
4
Texas Rule of Evidence 40375 is a verbatim adoption of Federal Rule of
Evidence 403,76 which the Fifth Circuit interpreted in Shipp v. General Mo-
tors Corp.77 In this products liability action brought on a crashworthiness
theory, the exclusion of the defendant manufacturer's film demonstrating
occupant movement in a rollover accident was held not an abuse of discre-
tion.78 The court's rationale was that the filmed "accident" was a multiple
rollover, whereas the accident under consideration was a single rollover and
involved a different vehicle with a substantially different roof and passenger
compartment. 79 That the visual aspect of the excluded exhibit may have
greatly impressed the jury did not lessen its cumulative nature.80
In Olin Corp. v. Dyson,81 a negligence action for personal injuries sus-
tained when a car collided with a portable crane owned and operated by the
appellant, the appellant complained of the trial court's exclusion of circum-
stantial evidence of alcohol consumption. Immediately after the collision
the car had a strong odor of beer, contained an unopened cold beer, spilled
beer, and loose ring tabs. The appellant had sought to introduce this evi-
dence to impeach the plaintiff's credibility as to the cause of the collision and
to prove contributory negligence. In affirming the exclusion, the court of
appeals held that circumstantial evidence of alcohol consumption is inadmis-
sible unless it is connected to the person alleged to have acted negligently. 82
Because the plaintiff's car carried two passengers, it was impossible to tell
from the evidence whether it was the plaintiff who was consuming the
alcohol. 83
Texas Rule of Evidence 410 governs the inadmissibility of guilty pleas,
plea discussions and related statements, and pleas of nolo contendere.84 A
plea of nolo contendere is not admissible against a defendant who made the
plea unless another statement made in the course of the same plea or plea
discussions has been introduced and the statement ought in fairness to be
considered contemporaneously with it. 85 In Cox v. Bohman86 the Corpus
Christi court of appeals reversed and remanded a case in which evidence was
admitted that the defendant had received and paid a traffic ticket arising out
of an automobile collision. The court treated the payment of the fine as a
plea of nolo contendere because in cases involving moving traffic violations
74. Id. at 209.
75. TEX. R. EvID. 403.
76. FED. R. EvID. 403.
77. 750 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1985).
78. Id. at 427.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 428.
81. 678 S.W.2d 650 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984), rev'd on other grounds, 692
S.W.2d 456 (Tex. 1985).
82. 678 S.W.2d at 654.
83. Id.
84. TEX. R. EvID. 410.
85. Id.
86. 683 S.W.2d 757, 758 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
19861
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for which the maximum punishment is a fine, payment of the fine constitutes
a finding of guilty "as though a plea of nolo contendere had been entered by
the defendant."'87 The court explained that under Texas Rule of Evidence
410 such pleas cannot be admitted in a civil suit for damages arising out of
the same incident. 88
Several cases decided during the survey period discussed common law
principles of relevance without interpreting the Texas Rules of Evidence.
One court explained that any evidence is relevant to a proposition if it tends
to prove or disprove any material fact about that proposition. 89 Texas Rule
of Evidence 401, as amended on November 1, 1984, also defines relevant
evidence as "evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact
that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or
less probable than it would be without the evidence." 90
Considering the relevance of similar facts and transactions in cases of real
estate valuation, a court explained that the prices paid for improved lots
cannot be used to establish the value of unimproved lots.9 1 The court held
that admitting testimony of the value of improved land in an action to con-
demn unimproved land was reversible error.92 Another pre-rules case held
that although personal opinion of good character reputation and evidence of
good character reputation generally was not proper, as it is now under Texas
Rule of Evidence 405,93 any error was harmless because an instruction suffi-
ciently cured the improper impeachment of the defendant's expert by a sin-
gle act of misconduct. 94
Texas Rule of Evidence 60895 prohibits the use of specific instances of the
conduct of a witness, other than conviction of a crime as provided for in
Texas Rule of Evidence 609,96 for the purpose of attacking or supporting his
credibility.9 7 Furthermore, evidence of other wrongs or acts is inadmissible
to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conform-
ity therewith. 98 Evidence of other wrongs, however, may be admissible for
other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,
plan, knowledge, identity or absence of mistake or accident. 99 In a pre-rules
case, Frank B. Hall & Co. v. Buck,m°0 the court held that the doctrine of res
87. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 27.14 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1986).
88. 683 S.W.2d at 758.
89. Rego Co. v. Brannon, 682 S.W.2d 677, 682 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1984,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
90. TEX. R. EvID. 401.
91. City of Odessa v. Meek, 695 S.W.2d 775, 776 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1985, no writ).
92. Id.
93. TEX. R. EvID. 405.
94. Commonwealth Lloyd's Ins. Co. v. Thomas, 678 S.W.2d 278, 294 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
95. TEX. R. EvID. 608.
96. Id. 609.
97. FED. R. EvID. 608(b), unlike the Texas rule, allows evidence of specific instances of a
witness's conduct to be used for impeachment.
98. TEX. R. EvID. 404(b).
99. Id.
100. 678 S.W.2d 612 (Tex. App.-Houston (14th Dist.] 1984, writ refd, n.r.e.), cert. de-
nied, 105 S. Ct. 2704, 86 L. Ed. 2d 720 (1985).
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inter alios acta, which provides that a party's prior acts or transactions are
not admissible to prove that similar acts have reoccurred, did not preclude
the admission of certain evidence not offered to prove that the parties had
engaged in the same pattern of conduct, but rather offered as evidence that
the witness was "beholden" to the defendant. 10
V. ARTICLE V-PRIVILEGES
Article V of the Texas Rules of Evidence governs privileges. The article
creates no new privileges.
The Texas Rules of Evidence provide confidentiality for communica-
tions 10 2 and for records 0 3 of a patient'0° who consults a professional' 05 for
diagnosis, evaluation, or treatment of any mental or emotional condition or
disorder, including alcoholism or drug addiction. 10 6 The general rule of priv-
ilege for communication between patient and professional contained in rule
510(b) is substantially the same as that created by its statutory predecessor,
article 5561h, 10 7 which was deemed repealed as to civil actions 08 with the
adoption of the Texas Rules of Evidence.
Rule 510(d) creates exceptions to the privilege not previously found in
article 5561h. 109 Rule 510(d)(5) creates an exception to the privilege when
relevant to
an issue of the physical, mental or emotional condition of a patient in
any proceeding in which he relies upon the condition as an element of
his claim or defense, or, after the patient's death, in any proceeding in
which any party relies upon the condition as an element of his claim or
defense .... 11o
This exception corrects the inequity of allowing a plaintiff to seek damages
for mental or emotional injuries while preventing a defendant from inquiring
about the plaintiff's mental condition prior to the subject incident.
Rule 510(d)(5) reduces the mental health information privilege."' A per-
son who places his mental or emotional condition in issue in a civil lawsuit
falls within an exception to the privilege of confidentiality, an exception that
101. 678 S.W.2d at 628.
102. TEX. R. EvID. 510(b)(1).
103. Id. 510(b)(2).
104. "Patient" is defined in id. 510(a)(2).
105. "Professional" is defined in id. 510(a)(l).
106. The privilege for communications by drug abusers originated in TEX. CODE CRIM.
PROC. ANN. art. 38.101 (Vernon 1979).
107. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5561h (Vernon Supp. 1986) (repealed by order of the
Supreme Court of Texas insofar as it relates to civil actions, cffective September 1, 1983).
108. Rule 510 "only governs disclosures of patient/client-professional communications in
judicial or administrative proceedings. Whether a professional may or must disclose such
communications in other circumstances is governed by TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art.
5561h." TEX. R. EVID. 510 official comment.
109. An exception to the privilege now exists when disclosure is relevant in any suit affect-
ing the parent-child relationship. TEX. R. EVID. 510(d)(6).
110. Id. 510(d)(5). The entire language of rule 510(d)(5) was substituted, effective Novem-
ber 1, 1984. Id. The new language expands the previous exception by including defenses as




did not exist under article 5561h.1 2 The first decision under this exception
to the privilege was Wimberly Resorts Property, Inc. v. Pfeuffer."13 Relying
on rule 51 0(d)(5), the Austin court of appeals conditionally granted a writ of
mandamus ordering the trial judge to set aside a protective order quashing
the deposition of the psychiatrist of a plaintiff who sought monetary dam-
ages for personal injuries including emotional trauma.' 14
A plaintiff does not have the right to use the psychotherapist/patient priv-
ilege offensively to shield information that would be material and relevant to
the defense of the plaintiff's claims. Ginsberg v. The Fifth Court of Ap-
peals" 15 was an original mandamus proceeding to the Texas Supreme Court
contesting the authority of the court of appeals to issue a mandamus di-
recting the trial court to cease discovery into certain allegedly privileged
matters. At issue was whether the plaintiff's psychiatric records were dis-
coverable in a trespass to try title suit. The plaintiff alleged that the defend-
ant had fraudulently tricked her into signing a deed. The records reflected
that the plaintiff had told her psychiatrist that the building to which she
claimed title had been sold.
The Texas Supreme Court agreed that the court of appeals abused its dis-
cretion by allowing the plaintiff to maintain her action and, simultaneoulsy,
allowing her to shield relevant and damaging information behind the curtain
of an asserted privilege. 116 The supreme court reversed the decision of the
Dallas court of appeals.' '7 Because the plaintiff's attempted use of the privi-
112. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4495b, § 5.08(4) (Vernon Supp. 1986), part of the
Medical Practices Act, which governed the confidentiality of communications between a physi-
cian and a patient, did contain a similar provision. Article 4495b, § 5.08 was also deemed
repealed as to civil actions in conjunction with the adoption of the Texas Rules of Evidence.
For a discussion of the difference between art. 4495b, § 5.08 and art. 5561h, see Dial v. State,
658 S.W.2d 823, 826 (Tex. App.-Austin 1983, no writ); see also Op. Tex. Atty' Gen. No.
MW-569 (1983) (discussing difference between art. 5561h and art. 4495b, § 5.08).
113. 691 S.W.2d 27 (Tex. App.-Austin 1985, no writ). In attempting to avoid his psychi-
atrist's deposition under rule 510(d)(5), plaintiff argued that art. 5561h controls, and that no
exception to art. 5561h required plaintiff's psychiatrist to disclose information about plaintiff.
Plaintiff argued that the adoption of the Texas Rules of Evidence did not repeal art. 5561h
because the supreme court has authority "to make and establish rules of procedure not incon-
sistent with the laws of the State .... TEX. CONST. OF 1876 art. V, § 25 (1891). Article
173 1a, § 2 provides that such rules shall not abridge, enlarge, or modify the substantive rights
of any litigant. Because rule 510(d)(5) reduces the statutory privilege of art. 556 1h, plaintiff
contended the rule was invalid. Relying on ex parte Abel, 613 S.W.2d 255, 262 (Tex. 1981),
the Austin court of appeals ruled that because the rule relates to the admissibility of evidence,
it is procedural and not substantive in nature, and that the repeal of art. 5561h is within the
legislative grant of authority of art. 1731a. 691 S.W.2d at 29.
114. 691 S.W.2d at 29.
115. 686 S.W.2d 105 (Tex. 1985).
116. Id. at 108.
117. Ginsberg v. Johnson, 673 S.W.2d 942, 943 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984), rev'd, 686
S.W.2d 105 (Tex. 1985); Gaynier v. Johnson, 673 S.W.2d 899, 903 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984),
rev'd, 686 S.W.2d 105 (Tex. 1985). Although reversed, the opinion is significant because the
Dallas court of appeals considered the effect of an erroneous order of production of psychiatric
records by the trial court. 673 S.W.2d at 943. The court held that the plaintiff did not waive
the privilege, despite the defendants' possession of the psychiatric records as a result of a prior
erroneous order of production and despite the claim that the records contained evidence
favorable to the defendants. Id. Although the Dallas court based its holding on TEX. R.
EvID. 510, the holding also casts light on the operation of id. 512, which provides that a claim
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lege was offensive rather than defensive, the supreme court held that it was
outside of the intended scope of Texas Rule of Evidence 510 and its prede-
cessor, article 5561h.1 8 In disallowing an offensive use of the privilege, the
court stated that a plaintiff who chooses to put his condition in issue "may
be forced to elect whether to claim his privilege or abandon his claim."' 19
Ginsberg should not be construed "as granting license to litigants to en-
gage in 'fishing expeditions' into privileged matters."'120 The Texas Supreme
Court specifically emphasized that the trial court, upon an in camera exami-
nation, had found the psychiatric records in question to be relevant to the
subject matter of the lawsuit. Reasoning that the admission of evidence and
the scope of discovery lie within the discretion of the trial court, the supreme
court explained that the trial court was properly within its discretion when it
deemed the psychiatric records discoverable.1 21 The court of appeals abused
its discretion by ordering the trial court to refrain from further discovery
pertaining thereto, because the denial of proper discovery constitutes a clear
abuse of discretion. 122
During the survey period the Amarillo court of appeals considered the
attorney-client privilege in Bearden v. Boone.123 In Bearden an investigator
hired by an attorney for the husband in a pending divorce action to gather
information about the wife brought a mandamus action seeking relief from
an interlocutory discovery order. The order required the investigator to re-
veal, in the wife's invasion of privacy suit against him, information he had
gathered in his investigation of the wife. The court held that the investiga-
tor's statute, 124 which provides that the holder of a private security commis-
sion shall not divulge any information he has acquired except as required by
law, did not prevent the investigator from answering questions pursuant to
court order.' 25 In conditionally granting the writ of mandamus, the court
explained that the investigator had the authority to claim the attorney-client
privilege on behalf of the husband under Texas Rule of Evidence 503 and
of privilege is not defeated by a disclosure that was compelled erroneously. In its earlier opin-
ion, the court also held that when the patient did not testify under deposition as to what she
told her psychiatrist and did not demonstrate an intent to relinquish the confidential communi-
cations, her testimony that she had been treated by a psychiatrist, had been hospitalized, and
had received shock treatment, was not sufficient to waive the privilege under rule 510. 673
S.W.2d at 905-07.
118. 686 S.W.2d at 107.
119. Id. (citing Henson v. Citizens Bank, 549 S.W.2d 446, 448 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland
1977, no writ) (fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination)). A compelling criticism
of this reasoning is contained in Caesar v. Mountanos, 542 F.2d 1064 (9th Cir. 1976): "There
is nothing voluntary about the injury suffered .... If he seeks redress ... [he is compelled] to
choose between his privacy and his right to seek legal redress. That Hobson's choice is not a
waiver . . . ." Id. at 1074 (Hufstedler, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
One commentator notes that because plaintiffs mental condition will be publicly disclosed
in making his case, disclosure of earlier information is relatively insignificant. Goode and
Sharlot, Article V. Privileges, 20 Hous. L. REV. 273, 375-76 (1983) (Tex. R. Evid. Handbook).
120. 686 S.W.2d at 108.
121. Id.
122. Id. (citing Jampole v. Touchy, 673 S.W.2d 569, 572 (Tex. 1984)).
123. 693 S.W.2d 25 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1985, no writ).
124. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4413 (29bb), § 28 (Vernon Supp. 1986).
125. 693 S.W.2d at 27.
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also that the confidential communications between the investigator and the
husband, or the husband's attorney, were protected under the work product
exemption during the pendency of the divorce litigation.' 26
Several cases decided during the survey period considered the fifth amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimination. In Ex parte Burroughs,27 the
Houston court of appeals held that the privilege against self-incrimination
was not violated by forcing a witness to give his name, profession, and office
location. 128 In In re Grand Jury Subpoena 129 the Fifth Circuit held that the
privilege did not preclude an individual's producing, pursuant to a grand
jury's subpoena, records of eight organizations he held in a representative
capacity.' 30 The witness, however, could not be compelled to identify an
entity as one of which he had control if the identification would tend to
incriminate him or furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to prose-
cute him.' 3 1 Finally, in United States v. Cid-Molina132 the Fifth Circuit held
that compelling a defendant to comply with a grand jury subpoena by exe-
cuting a consent directed to any bank or trust company at which he had a
bank account for production of bank records did not violate the privilege
against self-incrimination because the general language of the consent degree
contained no disclosure, no admission, and had no inculpatory effect.' 33
VI. ARTICLE VI-WITNESSES
Several of the Texas Rules of Evidence specifically govern impeachment of
witnesses' 34 and substantially liberalize the impeachment of witnesses.
While Texas common law permitted impeachment of a witness by a prior
conviction only if the conviction was not too remote in time to be proba-
tive, 13 5 rule 609(b) defines remoteness as the elapsing of ten years from the
date of conviction or release of the witness from confinement, whichever is
later. 136 Rule 608(a) expands prior Texas common law by allowing the use
of opinion as well as reputation testimony to impeach the character of a
witness. ' 37
126. Id. at 28.
127. 687 S.W.2d 444 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, no writ).
128. Id. at 446.
129. 767 F.2d 1130 (5th Cir. 1985).
130. Id. at 1131.
131. Id.
132. 767 F.2d 1131 (5th Cir. 1985).
133. Id. at 1132. Note the contrary holding by a different lower court in In re Grand Jury
Investigation, John Doe, 599 F. Supp. 746, 748 (S.D. Tex. 1984), which held that compelling
respondent to execute consent forms to allow foreign banks to supply the government with
bank records and consequently circumvent the foreign government's secrecy laws would be a
testimonial communication that might incriminate the respondent and thus violate his fifth
amendment privilege. Id.
134. See TEX. R. EvID. 607 (who may impeach); id. 608 (evidence of character and con-
duct of witness); id. 609 (evidence of conviction of crime).
135. Landry v. Travelers Ins. Co., 458 S.W.2d 649, 650-51 (Tex. 1970). (trial judge, who
weighs all the facts and circumstances, has discretion to determine remoteness).
136. TEX. R. EvID. 609(b).




Rule 612(a) allows impeachment of a witness by examination concerning
a prior inconsistent statement. 38 During the survey period rule 612 was
amended by adding the provision "[if] written, the writing need not be
shown to him at that time, but on request the same shall be shown to oppos-
ing counsel" to both subsections of the rule.' 39
Pre-rule case law, which appears unchanged by the rules, held that a prior
statement used for impeachment cannot be used as substantive evidence of
the truth of the facts stated therein.14 0 No Texas case decided during the
survey period interpreted any of the article VI rules governing
impeachment. 141
VII. ARTICLE VII-OPINIONS AND EXPERT TESTIMONY
A. Texas Rules of Evidence
Some of the most significant changes wrought by the Texas Rules of Evi-
dence are contained in article VII, governing opinions and expert testi-
mony.' 42 Article VII allows far more liberal admission of expert opinions
and lay witness opinions based on personal perceptions than did prior case
law. Lay witnesses may now state their opinions as long as their opinions
are helpful and rationally based on perception.143 Further, Texas Rule of
Evidence 704 provides that opinion testimony is not objectionable solely be-
cause it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided in the case. 44 The facts
that form the bases of an expert's opinion may now be outside the record if
they are the type of hearsay reasonably relied upon by experts in the same
field. 145
While rule 703146 defines the permissible substance of an expert's opinion,
rule 705 defines the method of offering it. Rule 705 contains a very impor-
tant change from prior Texas practice. No longer is it necessary for an ex-
pert witness to present his opinions in answer to hypothetical questions. An
expert may now state an opinion without stating its foundation, leaving op-
posing counsel to inquire as to the basis of the opinion.' 47 The court, how-
ever, can still require an expert to state the data underlying his opinion prior
to admitting the opinion.148
138. Id. 612(a).
139. Id. 612.
140. Cecil v. Zivley, 683 S.W.2d 853, 857 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ).
141. See supra note 134 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 95-101 and accompa-
nying text (discussing pre-rule cases that dealt with impeachment).
142. TEX. R. EVID. art. VII.
143. Id. 701.
144. Id. 704.
145. Id. 703. This rule may nullify the limitation of Moore v. Grantham, 599 S.W.2d 287,
289 (Tex. 1980), that the testimony of an expert may not be based solely on hearsay. Virtually
all expert testimony is necessarily based at least partially on hearsay, and rule 703 seems to
abolish the limitation on how much hearsay an expert may consider in formulating his opin-
ions. TEX. R. EvID. 703.
146. TEX. R. EvID. 703.
147. Id. at 705.
148. Id. Another important change in examination of experts is contained in id. 803(18),
the hearsay exception governing learned treatises. Learned treatises may now be proved by
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B. Qualifications of Experts and Admissibility of Testimony
If the trier of fact would be assisted in understanding evidence or deter-
mining a fact issue by specialized knowledge, then "a witness qualified as an
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." 49 An expert may also draw
inferences from facts and evidence that a jury is not competent to draw. 150
To justify the use of expert opinion testimony, however, the subject of the
inference or conclusion must be beyond the knowledge of the typical lay-
man. 151 The witness must also have have sufficient skill, knowledge, or ex-
perience within the particular field to demonstrate that he is qualified to
express an opinion.152
The trial court has tremendous discretion to determine the admissibility of
expert testimony, and an appeals court will not disturb a trial court's deci-
sion to admit or exclude expert testimony absent an abuse of discretion. 153
During the survey period the Corpus Christi court of appeals in Walter Bax-
ter Seed Co. v. Rivera1 54 upheld the trial court's decision to admit expert
opinion testimony from farmers. 155 The court explained that farmers may
become experts in matters particularly within their knowledge and that
practical experience is an acceptable way of gaining expertise.156 Each of the
farmers called as witnesses testified as to their years of experience in farming,
the amount of ground they farmed, accepted farming practices, and their
specific knowledge in the areas in which the crops in question were
planted. 157
C. Effect of Opinion Testimony
Several appellate courts during the survey period considered the effects of
expert opinion testimony and the extent to which either a court or a jury is
bound by the opinions of an expert. In upholding the right of a jury to
disbelieve an expert who was neither impeached nor contradicted a Houston
court of appeals held in Herbert v. Pan American Van Lines, Inc. 158 that
testimony of experts is only evidentiary and not binding upon the trier of
one's expert on direct examination, by other expert testimony, or by judicial notice. Id. If
admitted, the statements may be read into evidence but may not be received as exhibits. Id.
Prior Texas law allowed learned treatises to be used only to cross-examine an expert regarding
his opinions, not as substantive evidence. Bowles v. Borden, 148 Tex. 1, 4, 219 S.W.2d 779,
783 (1949). Prior case law also required that the expert being examined recognize the treatise
as authorative as a prerequisite to its use in cross-examination. Id.
149. TEX. R. EvID. 702.
150. See 2 R. RAY, supra note 44, § 1400, at 23-27.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. See Wilson v. Scott, 412 S.W.2d 299, 303-04 (Tex. 1967) (testimony of retired doctor
with no special knowledge of satapedectomy properly excluded).
154. 677 S.W.2d 241 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
155. Id. at 244.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. 681 S.W.2d 221 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ).
[Vol. 40
EVIDENCE
fact. 159 The trier of fact is the sole judge of the credibility of a witness and
the weight to be given his testimony. Opinion evidence is usually insufficient
to establish a fact issue at trial.160
The jury's discretion, however, is limited to the resolution of conflicting
evidence. The jury does not have the power to ignore evidence and decide
an issue in accordance with its own whims. 161 In Kiel v. Texas Employers
Insurance Association ' 62 a Houston court of appeals reversed a jury's finding
that an employee's heart attack did not occur in the course of employment
because the finding was so against the great weight of the evidence as to be
manifestly unjust.' 6 3 The court explained that unrebutted expert testimony
may be considered as conclusive if the subject matter required the jury to be
guided solely by the testimony of experts and the evidence is otherwise credi-
ble and free from contradiction or inconsistency. 164 The court explained
that although the unrebutted expert testimony did not conclusively establish
causation as a matter of law, causation was neither rebutted nor weakened
on cross-examination, and, therefore, the jury's finding was simply unjust. 165
During a survey period, experts were allowed to express opinions on a
variety of subjects. Expert testimony was held proper to impute to a build-
ing contractor knowledge of industry standards as codified 166 and that
u-bolts on the rear suspension of a pickup had not been torqued to the same
degree as at the factory. 167 In Delaporte v. Preston Square, Inc. 168 the Dallas
court of appeals allowed an experienced, licensed architect to testify in a case
alleging violations of deed restrictions that the additions in question were
inconsistent with the original design of the development. 169
* In Shipp v. General Motors Corp.,170 a products liability crashworthiness
case complaining of roof design, expert opinion was held sufficient to estab-
lish a standard of due care and proper conduct even though no other passen-
ger car manufactured used the roof design that the plaintiff's expert
proffered. 171 In other cases expert opinion testimony was held sufficient evi-
dence to support judgments for fair market value of rent, 172 and attorney's
159. Id. at 222.
160. Teal v. Powell Lumber Co., 262 S.W.2d 223, 239 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1953,
no writ).
161. Mack v. Moore, 669 S.W.2d 415, 418 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1984, no writ).
162. 679 S.W.2d 656 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, no writ).
163. Id. at 659.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Jim Walter Homes, Inc. v. Gonzalez, 686 S.W.2d 715, 718 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
1985, no writ).
167. Ford Motor Co. v. Pool, 688 S.W.2d 879, 882 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1985), rev'd on
other grounds, 29 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 204 (Feb. 12, 1986). The court held that when coupled with
evidence that the u-bolt had fallen off, this expert testimony was sufficient to sustain a finding
that the u-bolt was defective. Id.
168. 680 S.W.2d 561 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, writ refd n.r.e.).
169. Id. at 565.
170. 750 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1985).
171. Id. at 422.




fees. 173 Expert opinion was also held sufficient evidence of causation to es-
tablish that the foundation of a building settled due to failure of the builder
to compact the filled dirt property, thus supporting a finding of breach of
implied warranty of construction in a good and workmanlike manner.174
By contrast, in a products liability case an expert opined that the failure of
the manufacturer to place a warning on the machine in question was a pro-
ducing cause of the plaintiff's injuries, and that removal of the start-up key
for the machine, as well as affixing a warning to the machine, would have
likely prevented the accident in question. 175 Although these facts provided
some evidence that failure to warn was a producing cause of the occurrence
in question, the San Antonio court of appeals held that these factors were
insufficient to support a jury finding for the plaintiff on the causation is-
sue. 176 In a will contest a Houston court of appeals held that the opinion
testimony of the attorney who drafted the will in question was competent to
show what he thought the testatrix intended to do, but was incompetent to
show the testatrix's actual intention as expressed in the will. 177 Finally, con-
flicting expert testimony as to whether a movable scaffolding was unreasona-
bly dangerous for its intended use created a fact issue for the jury as to
whether the scaffolding was defective.1 78
D. Testimony of Medical Experts
The trier of fact usually determines the issue of causation, even when ex-
pert testimony demonstrates probable causation.179 The burden of proof in
a medical malpractice cause is on the patient.' 80 The patient must prove
that the physician has undertaken a mode or form of treatment that a rea-
sonable and prudent doctor would not have undertaken under the same or
similar circumstances. 81 Expert testimony is required to meet this burden
of proof. In considering the standard to which expert testimony must rise,
the Fifth Circuit in Ayres v. United States, 82 a medical malpractice action
governed by Texas law, held that expert testimony need only show that the
negligence was a proximate cause of the injuries, not that it was the sole
proximate cause. 183 Barclay v. Campbell'8 4 involved a patient's medical
173. Barclay v. Johnson, 686 S.W.2d 334, 339 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, writ
refd n.r.e.).
174. De Los Santos v. Alamo Lumber Co., 683 S.W.2d 48, 51 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
1984, no writ).
175. Ragsdale Bros., Inc. v. Magro, 693 S.W.2d 530, 539 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985,
no writ).
176. Id.
177. Kaufhold v. Mclver, 682 S.W.2d 660, 667 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, writ
refd n.r.e.).
178. Sharpe v. Safway Scaffolds Co., 687 S.W.2d 386, 392 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1985, no writ).
179. Lenger v. Physician's Gen. Hosp., Inc., 455 S.W.2d 703, 706 (Tex. 1970) (doctor testi-
fied as to possible causes for separation of sutures of mesentery).
180. Hood v. Phillips, 454 S.W.2d 160, 165 (Tex. 1977).
181. Id.
182. 750 F.2d 449 (5th Cir. 1985).
183. Id. at 454.
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malpractice suit against his physician for failing to disclose certain risks as-
sociated with a prescribed medication. In Barclay the Dallas court of ap-
peals wrote that expert testimony that the condition is an "inherent" risk,
which means that some statistical probability of risk exists, however small, is
different from testimony that a condition is "inherently dangerous," which
means an activity accompanied by an unusual or extraordinary risk.' 85
Holding that no jury issue of informed consent was presented, the Dallas
court explained that the inherent risk must be more than negligible or theo-
retical when viewed prospectively at the time a medical procedure is
recommended. ' 86
The Texas Supreme Court reversed, holding that the expert testimony
raised a jury issue on informed consent.' 87 The court explained that the
issue is "whether 'a reasonable person' could have been influenced in making
a decision whether to give or withhold consent to the procedure had he
known of the risk." 88
E. Basis of Expert Opinion
During the survey period, one case dealt with the basis of expert opinion.
In McKnight v. Hill & Hill Exterminators, Inc., ' 89 a case involving termite
infestation, the Texas Supreme Court recognized that the date of termite
infestation cannot be exactly determined.' 90 The court held, however, that
an expert may form a conclusion as to the approximate date of infestation
through his examination of the premises and his analysis of the damaged
wood. 191
F. Examination of Experts
The Texas Rules of Evidence have made a significant change in examina-
tion of experts by reference to authorities within their areas of expertise.
This change is illustrated by one pre-rules case decided during the survey
period, Wendell v. Central Power & Light Co.' 92 At common law a book
recognized as authoritative by a witness or relied on by him in forming his
opinion could be used to cross-examine him by a reading of excerpts from
that book.193 Prior to the Texas Rules of Evidence, technical literature was
admissible, if at all, only through cross-examination of an expert who recog-
184. 683 S.W.2d 498 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984), rev'd, 29 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 124, 125 (Jan. 8,
1986).
185. 683 S.W.2d at 500-01.
186. Id. The court also held that expert opinion is required to establish the materiality of
the risk, if it is not one of those listed by a panel of experts, to determine which risks related to
medical care should be disclosed under Texas Revised Civil Statutes art. 4590i. Id.; see TEX.
REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i (Vernon Supp. 1986).
187. 29 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 125.
188. Id.
189. 689 S.W.2d 206 (Tex. 1985).
190. Id. at 208.
191. Id.
192. 677 S.W.2d 610 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1984, writ refd n.r.e.).
193. Id. at 620.
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nized the work as authoritative and for the limited purpose of questioning
his expertise. 194 Under Texas Rule of Evidence 803(18), however, an expert
can be cross-examined on statements contained in a published treatise if the
treatise is established as a reliable authority by him or "by other expert testi-
mony or by judicial notice."' 95 Contrary to the correct pre-rules holding of
Wendell, no longer can an expert thwart cross-examination by refusing to
recognize a learned treatise as authoritative.
G. Lay Opinions
As noted above, the Texas Rules of Evidence have greatly liberalized the
admission of opinion testimony by lay witnesses.' 96 Texas case law has al-
ways been liberal, however, in allowing an owner of property to testify as to
his opinion of its value. 197 An owner of property can give such testimony
even though he would not be qualified to testify as an expert regarding the
value of the same property if it were owned by another person.' 98 During
the survey period an owner was allowed to testify not only as to the value of
his stolen automobile, but also as to the value of one-hundred tapes in his car
at the time it was stolen. 199
H. Effect of Lay Opinion
Although the Texas Rules of Evidence have greatly liberalized the admis-
sion of opinion testimony by lay witnesses, lay opinion testimony still has its
limitations. During the survey period the court in Fitzgerald v. Caterpillar
Tractor Co.200 held that the lay testimony of the plaintiff, who was neither an
engineer nor an expert on forklift or forklift blade assembly design, could not
raise a fact issue as to the design, material, or manufacture of a complicated
piece of machinery, such as a forklift.2 0 1
VIII. ARTICLE VIII-HEARSAY
A. Identifying Hearsay
Whether a record or statement offered to prove its truth is hearsay is often
difficult to determine. 20 2 " 'Hearsay' is a statement, other than one made by
the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to
194. See, e.g., Bowles v. Bourdon, 148 Tex. 1, 6, 219 S.W.2d 779, 783 (1949).
195. TEX. R. EvID. 803(18).
196. Id. 701; see supra text accompanying notes 143-44.
197. Classified Parking Sys. v. Kirby, 507 S.W.2d 586, 588 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1974, no writ) (owner of car stolen from parking garage was competent to testify
as to car's value).
198. Id.
199. Aatco Transmission Co. v. Hollins, 682 S.W.2d 682, 686 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1984, no writ).
200. 683 S.W.2d 162 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
201. Id. at 164.
202. TEX. R. EvID. 801-806 comprehensively define the hearsay rule and its exceptions.
Additionally, id. 602 provides that "[a] witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is
introduced sufficient to support a finding that he has personal knowledge of the matter."
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prove the truth of the matter asserted. ' 20 3 In Cook v. Cook2° 4 the San
Antonio court of appeals held that a letter that was not properly authenti-
cated and introduced in evidence was hearsay.
B. Statements That Are Not Hearsay
1. Prior Statement by Witness. Texas Rule of Evidence 801(e) excludes
from the definition of hearsay prior statements by a witness, 20 5 admissions
by party-opponents, 20 6 and depositions.20 7 Not all prior statements by a wit-
ness are admissible. Prior statements are admissible only if they are incon-
sistent with the declarant's present trial testimony and given under oath
subject to the penalty of perjury20 8 or are consistent with the declarant's
testimony and are offered to rebut an express or implied charge of recent
fabrication or improper influence or motive, 20 9 or if they constitute identifi-
cation of a person made after perceiving him.210 Additionally, prior state-
ments are admissible only if the declarant testifies at trial and is subject to
cross-examination concerning the statement. 2 11
During the survey period, a Houston court of appeals affirmed the exclu-
sion of a prior consistent statement of a witness accused of recent
fabrication. 2 12 The court recognized that the witness already had been ex-
cused from the courtroom at the time the statements were offered; as a re-
sult, had the statement been admitted, the opposing party would have had
no opportunity to cross-examine the witness. 2 13
2. Vicarious Admissions. Texas Rule of Evidence 801 (e)(2)(D) reversed the
much criticized holding of Big Mac Trucking Co. v. Dickerson.2 14 In Big
Mac the court limited the category of agent or servant admissions that are
admissible against the principal.21 5 Under the new rule, admissions of
agents or employees are admissible if they are made during the existence of
an employment relationship and concern matters within the scope of the
employment relationship, even though the agent or servant has no authority
to speak.2 16
203. Id. 801(d). "Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by these rules or by other
rules prescribed by the Supreme Court or by law." Id. 802.
204. 679 S.W.2d 581, 584 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1984, no writ).







212. Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Vlach, 687 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985,
no writ).
213. Id. at 418.
214. 497 S.W.2d 283 (Tex. 1973).
215. The Texas Supreme Court held that the hearsay statements of an agent or employee
should be admitted against a principal as vicarious admissions only when the trial judge finds,
as a preliminary fact, that the statements were authorized. Id. at 287.
216. TEX. R. EvID. 801(e)(2)(D).
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In Southmark Management Corp. v. Vick 2 17 a Houston court of appeals
affirmed the admission into evidence of a tenant's conversation with the
property manager about continuing an existing lease. The court explained
that the conversations were not hearsay but were admissions by the landlord
through its employee concerning a matter within the scope of her employ-
ment made during that employment.2 18 In Elliot Valve Repair Co. v. B.J.
Valve & Fitting Co.,219 a suit on a sworn account for a company's alleged
failure to pay for a valve, the company's sales person's conversation with the
plaintiff inquiring about the availability of valves was not hearsay as it was a
statement by an agent of the company within the scope of his agency or
employment and admissible under Texas Rule of Evidence 801(e)(2)(D). 220
3. Judicial Admissions. A fact that is judicially admitted does not require
evidence and establishes the fact admitted as a matter of law, thereby pre-
cluding the fact finder from finding any contrary facts.22' A judicial admis-
sion is really a substitute for evidence. 222 The Texas Rules of Evidence,
while not specifically distinguishing judicial admissions from other admis-
sions, treat admissions not as exceptions to the hearsay rule, but rather, as
statements that are not hearsay.22 3
A party or someone authorized to make statements on his behalf, such as
his attorney, can make judicial admissions.2 24 During the survey period,
Kennesaw Life & Accident Insurance Co. v. Gross225 held a statement in a
trial pleading to be a judicial admission, requiring no proof of the admitted
fact and precluding the introduction of any evidence to the contrary.22 6 A
statement in a pleading was also held to be a judicial admission in Hobbs v.
Hobbs.2 27 Another court found the statement of the appellant's attorney in
arguments to the court to be a judicial admission that bound the appellant to
the position stated.22 8
Although a party may not introduce his own abandoned pleading for the
purpose of proving his own case, where an abandoned pleading and affidavit
of adverse possession were introduced into evidence by the opposing party in
217. 692 S.W.2d 157 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
218. Id. at 160.
219. 675 S.W.2d 555, 562-63 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]), rev'd on other grounds, 679
S.W.2d 1 (Tex. 1984).
220. TEX. R. EvID. 801(e)(2)(D).
221. 1A R. RAY, supra note 44, § 1147. The Texas Supreme Court established five require-
ments for judicial admissions in Griffin v. Superior Ins. Co., 161 Tex. 195, 201, 338 S.W.2d
415, 419 (1960). This opinion, as well as the strong dissent by four justices, contains a compre-
hensive discussion of the nuances involved in judicial admissions.
222. IA R. RAY, supra note 44, § 1127.
223. See TEX. R. EvID. 801(e)(2).
224. Id.
225. 694 S.W.2d 115 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, writ refd n.r.e.).
226. Id. at 117; see Hinojosa v. Castellow Chevrolet Oldsmobile, Inc., 678 S.W.2d 707, 714
(Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (statements in trial pleadings are judicial
admissions).
227. 691 S.W.2d 75, 76 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, writ dism'd).
228. Carrol Instrument Co. v. B.W.B. Controls, Inc., 677 S.W.2d 654, 659 (Tex. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, no writ).
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a trespass to try title suit, and the party introducing them did not limit the
purpose for which the exhibits were admitted, plaintiff could rely on the
metes and bounds description contained in the exhibits to provide a legal
description of a tract of land. 229 A judicial admission may also be made in
the form of a party's own testimony. 230 For a party's testimony to be con-
clusive against him, it must be made during the course of a judicial proceed-
ing, the statement must be contrary to an essential fact embraced in his
theory of recovery or defense, the statement must be deliberate, clear, and
unequivocal, and the statement must not be destructive of the opposing
party's theory of recovery. 23' The rule that bars a party's recovery by his
own testimonial declarations is one of public policy. To allow a party to
recover after he has clearly and unequivocally sworn himself out of court
would be absurd and unjust, as explained in City of San Antonio v. Mi-
randa.232 The testimony of parties to a suit must be regarded as evidence,
however, and not taken as facts admitted. 233
Judicial admissions must be clear and unequivocal. One court during the
survey period held that when the transcription of a venue hearing failed to
convey with any degree of lucidity what was actually said or meant by the
party's attorneys, no judicial admission could be found. 234 Bray v. Mc-
Neely, 235 a breach of contract action, held that because the plaintiff's testi-
mony regarding a money transaction was ambiguous at best,
characterization of the transaction as a loan rather than an investment was
not an admission.2 36
C. Hearsay Exceptions: Availability of Declarant Immaterial
1. Recorded Recollections. Texas Rule of Evidence 803(5) admits into evi-
dence as an exception to the hearsay rule:
A memorandum or record concerning a matter about which a witness
once had personal knowledge but now has insufficient recollection to
enable him to testify fully and accurately, shown to have been made or
adopted by the witness when the matter was fresh in his memory and to
reflect that knowledge correctly, unless the circumstances of prepara-
tion cast doubt on the document's trustworthiness. 237
The proper predicate for the admission of a written record requires a show-
ing that the witness had insufficient recollection to enable him to testify fully
229. Stafford v. Jackson, 687 S.W.2d 784, 787 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, no
writ).
230. Brown v. Carroll, 683 S.W.2d 61, 63 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1984, no writ).
231. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Carr, 242 S.W.2d 224, 229 (Tex. Civ. App.-
San Antonio 1951, writ ref'd).
232. 683 S.W.2d 517, 520 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1984, no writ).
233. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Carr, 242 S.W.2d 224, 229 (Tex. Civ. App.-
San Antonio 1951, writ ref'd).
234. Canales v. Estate of Canales, 683 S.W.2d 77, 81-82 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1984,
no writ).
235. 682 S.W.2d 615 (Tex. App,-Houston [ist Dist.] 1984, no writ).
236. Id. at 618.
237. TEX. R. EvID. 803(5).
1986]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
and accurately. 238 In In re: Corrugated Container Anti-Trust Litigation239
the Fifth Circuit affirmed the exclusion from evidence of a transcribed inter-
view when the record contained no evidence that a witness was unable to
recall the events in question or that a recorded interview with the witness
correctly reflected what was fresh in his memory at the time.240 The Fifth
Circuit relied on Federal Rule of Evidence 803(5), which is substantially
similar to Texas Rule of Evidence 803(5).241
2. Business Records. Texas Rule of Evidence 803(6)242 governs the intro-
duction of records of regularly conducted activities. Rule 803(6) replaces
the previous statutory exception to the hearsay rule that allowed the admis-
sion of business and other records.24 3 This survey period was the first during
which any Texas court considered the operation of rule 803(6).
Texas Rule of Evidence 803(6) allows into evidence as exceptions to the
hearsay rule the records of regularly conducted activities, commonly known
as business records, once certain prerequisites of that rule are "shown by the
testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness."'244 Preserving the
statutory requirements of repealed article 3737e, rule 803(6) requires that
information in the records must have been kept in the course of a regularly
conducted business activity by a person with knowledge at or near the time
of the matter recorded, and that it was the regular practice of the business to
make such records. 245 Pfeffer v. Southern Texas Laborers' Pension Trust
Fund246 interpreted the personal knowledge requirement. The court held
that payroll audit records were admissible under rule 803(6) when the
records that the auditor reviewed were provided by a party with personal
knowledge, notwithstanding the auditor's lack of personal knowledge of the
hours actually worked by the laborers in question. 247
Texas Rule of Evidence 803(6) does not establish any additional predicate
when the records offered are electronically generated. McAllen State Bank v.
Linbeck Construction Corp.24 8 established that whether business records are
maintained in a computer rather than in company books is immaterial in
determining their admissibility, provided the opposing party is given the
same opportunity to inquire into the accuracy of the input procedures used
238. Id.
239. 756 F.2d 411 (5th Cir. 1985).
240. Id. at 414.
241. Id.
242. TEX. R. EvID. 803(6). The new practice of qualifying business records remains sub-
stantially the same as the procedure under former TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 3737(e)
(Vernon Supp. 1986) (repealed as to civil actions in 1983).
243. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 3737(e) (Vernon Supp. 1986). Article 3737(e) was
repealed in 1983, insofar as it applied to civil actions, in conjunction with the adoption of the
Texas Rules of Evidence.
244. TEX. R. EvID. 803(6). Id. 902(10) permits the introduction of business records ac-
companied by an affidavit that conforms to the requirements set forth in that rule.
245. Id. 803(6).
246. 679 S.W.2d 691 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
247. Id. at 693.
248. 695 S.W.2d 10 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1985, writ refd n.r.e.).
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as he would have to inquire into the accuracy of written business records. 249
Once the requirements of rule 803(6) are met, computerized business records
are admissible without any additional predicate. 250 No longer is the propo-
nent of computerized business records required to lay a predicate showing
that "the particular computing equipment is recognized as standard equip-
ment ... and that the records were prepared by persons who understood
operation of the equipment and whose regular duty was to operate it.' '25 1
Such matters now go to the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility. 2 52
In Clark v. Walker-Kurth Lumber Co. 253 a Houston court of appeals held
that invoices representing sales were properly admitted under rule 803(6).254
The testimony of the appellee's credit manager established that the invoices
were prepared by salesmen with knowledge of the transactions, that supplies
could not be collected for pickup or delivery without an invoice specifying
the materials needed, and that each invoice was signed by the party receiving
the goods. In affirming the admission of the invoices into evidence, the court
explained that the predicate for admissibility under rule 803(6) is sufficiently
established if a party can demonstrate that the documents are records gener-
ated pursuant to a course of regularly conducted business activity and that
the records are, as a practical matter, always created by or from information
transmitted by a person with knowledge, at or near the time of the event. 255
The credit manager's testimony established this predicate for admission. 256
3. Statement Against Interest. A distinction exists between two frequently
confused exceptions to the hearsay rule: the declarations against interest
249. Id. at 17.
250. Id. McAllen did not consider the relationship, if any, between TEX. R. EvID. 803(6)
and id. 901(b)(9), which requires authentication of systems used to produce a result as a condi-
tion precedent to admissibility. Texas rule 901(b)(9) was copied from Federal rule 901(b)(9),
which was "designed for situations in which the accuracy of the result is dependent upon a
process or system which produces it." FED. R. EvID. 901(b)(9) advisory committee note. The
federal rules specifically contemplated the application of rule 901(b)(9) to computers and the
possibility of taking judicial notice of the accuracy of the processing system. Id.
One commentator has argued that, given the significant role of computers in contemporary
society, rule 901(b)(9) should be interpreted as incorporating prior Texas law that did not
require a special foundation for computerized business records. "When a process or system
has become so well established that it is commonplace, as is the case with computers, testimo-
nial description and endorsement of accuracy are no longer needed, and the foundation can be
assumed or established by judicial notice." Hippard, Article X.: Contents of Writings, Record-
ings, and Photographs, 20 Hous. L. REV. 595, 601 (1983 Tex. R. Evid. Handbook). This
suggested presumption of reliability would shift the burden of evaluating the reliability to the
opponent of the evidence and would shift the form for ascertaining defects from trial to discov-
ery. See Comment, Admitting Computer Generated Records: A Presumption ofReality, 18 J.
MAR. L. REV. 115, 121 (1984).
251. Railroad Comm'n v. Southern Pac. Ry., 468 S.W.2d 125, 129 (Tex. Civ. App.-Aus-
tin 1971, writ refd n.r.e.); see O'Shee v. IBM Corp., 578 S.W.2d 844, 848 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 1979, writ refd n.r.e.) (recognizing correct steps to follow in establishing
predicate to introduce computerized business records into evidence).
252. IA R. RAY, supra note 44, § 1264.
253. 689 S.W.2d 275 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).





exception and the admissions of party-opponents exception. 25 7 Admissions
of party-opponents are admissible into evidence without satisfying any of the
requirements for declarations against interest. 258 Generally stated, state-
ments of a person that are inconsistent with proprietary or pecuniary interest
are considered to be declarations against interest. 259 Admissions do not
need to be against the interest of the party when made, and the party making
the admission need not be unavailable. 260 The Texas Rules of Evidence,
while treating statements against interest as exceptions to the hearsay rule,
treat party-opponent admissions as statements that are not hearsay. 26' The
Houston court of appeals considered the hearsay exception for statements
against interest in Leigh v. Weiner.2 62 The court held that a testatrix's hear-
say statements that she had promised to leave her estate to her deceased
husband's children were admissible as declarations against her pecuniary
interest. 263
4. Public Records and Reports. Texas Rule of Evidence 803(8) governs the
introduction of public records and reports and replaces the previous statu-
tory exception to the hearsay rule allowing the admission of official docu-
ments.264 Generally stated, records of public offices or agencies setting forth
the activities of the office or agency, matters observed pursuant to duty im-
posed by law as to which matters there was a duty to report, or factual
findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to authority granted
by law are admissible in evidence, unless the sources of the information or
other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness. 265 No Texas case had
yet interpreted rule 803(8), but one case decided during the survey period
explained the operation of its statutory forerunner, article 3731a. In Rail-
road Commission v. Rio Grande Valley Gas Co. 266 the court affirmed the
exclusion of two documents offered under the official documents exception
to the hearsay rule. 2 6 7 The court explained that the official documents ex-
ception is applicable only when public officials or employees under their su-
pervision in the performance of their official duties prepare the
documents. 268 Furthermore, documents prepared by private individuals and
simply filed with the Railroad Commission were not "official documents" as
257. TEX. R. EviD. 801(e)(2) defines admissions of party opponents, and id. 803(24) de-
fines statements against interest..
258. See generally IA R. RAY, supra note 44, § 1122 (distinction between admissions and
declarations against interest).
259. Id. § 1001, at 248.
260. Id. Note that TEX. R. EvID. 803(24), governing statements against interest, makes
the availability of the declarant immaterial to the admission of the statement against interest.
261. TEX. R. EVID. 801(e).
262. 679 S.W.2d 46 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ).
263. Id. at 49 (citing TEX. R. EVID. 803(24)).
264. TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 3731a (Vernon Supp. 1986) (repealed as to civil
actions 1983).
265. TEX. R. EvID. 803(8).
266. 683 S.W,2d 783 (Tex. App.-Austin 1984, no writ).
267. Id. at 789.
268. Id. at 788.
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contemplated by article 3731a.269
D. Hearsay Exceptions: Declarant Unavailable
Texas Rule of Evidence 804 allows into evidence as exceptions to the hear-
say rule former testimony, dying declarations, and statements of personal or
family history, if the declarant is unavailable as a witness.2 70 Compton v.
WWV Enterprises27 I held affidavits of heirship inadmissible.2 72 The court
concluded that the affidavits of heirship would have been admissible as a
statement of personal or family history if there had been a showing of un-
availability of the declarant. 273
E. Effect of Unobjected-to Hearsay
Texas Rules of Evidence 802 provides that "[i]nadmissible hearsay admit-
ted without objection shall not be denied probative value merely because it is
hearsay."'274 The Houston court of appeals in K-Mart Apparel Fashions
Corp. v. Ramsey275 applied this rule in a default judgment case. The court
held that in a negligence action the affidavit of a neurosurgeon showing
plaintiff's medical expenses had probative value when it was not objected to
as hearsay. 276
IX. ARTICLE IX-AUTHENTICATION AND IDENTIFICATION
Texas Rule of Evidence 901 requires authentication or identification of
evidence as a condition precedent to admissibility. 277 The authentication
requirement is "satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the
matter in question is what its proponent claims. '27 8 In Cook v. Cook,279 a
pre-rules case, the San Antonio court of appeals held that a letter that had
not been properly authenticated and introduced into evidence was hear-
say. 280 Although not decided under article IX, the result would clearly be
the same under the rules.
Texas Rule of Evidence 902 governs self-authentication, namely, docu-
ments for which extrinsic evidence of authenticity is not required as a condi-
tion precedent to admissibility. 28 ' A self-authenticated document is not
necessarily admissible, however. A self-authenticated document will be ex-
cluded if it is hearsay that does not fall within an exception to the hearsay
269. Id.
270. TEX. R. EvID. 804(B)(1)-(3). Id. 804(a) defines unavailability.
271. 679 S.W.2d 668 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1984, no writ).
272. Id. at 670.
273. Id. at 671.
274. TEX. R. EvID. 802.
275. 695 S.W.2d 243 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.) 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
276. Id. at 247.
277. TEX. R. EVID. 901.
278. Id. 901(a).
279. 679 S.W.2d 581 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1984, no writ).
280. Id. at 584.
281. TEX. R. EVID. 902.
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rule, as in Compton v. WWV Enterprises.282
Article 3731(a) previously governed self-authentication. 2 83  Article
3731(a) made no distinction between sealed and unsealed documents. 28 4
However, Texas Rule of Evidence 902(1) gives special treatment to original
sealed documents. 285 Rule 902(1) makes this distinction and presumes the
authenticity of documents bearing both a seal purporting to be that of the
United States or of any state, district, commonwealth, territory, insular pos-
session, the Panama Canal Zone, the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands,
or of a political subdivision department, officer, agency, or a signature pur-
porting to be an attestation or execution.2 86 Rule 902(1) requires only a seal
and a signature. 287 No longer must the proponent of an out-of-state sealed
document obtain both an attestation and a proper certificate as formerly re-
quired under article 3731(a), section 4.288 A pre-rules case that would have
been decided differently under rule 902(1) is Starzl v. Starzl.2 89 In Starzl the
Dallas court of appeals found inadmissible a foreign judgment that did not
contain a certification from the judge of a court of record that the official
custodian did in fact have official custody of the judgment. 290 The court
held that the foreign judgment was not properly authenticated and not in
compliance with article 373 1(a). 2 9 1 The court specifically noted that the case
was tried prior to the effective date of the Texas Rules of Evidence.
292
X. ARTICLE X-CONTENTS OF WRITINGS, RECORDINGS, AND
PHOTOGRAPHS
Article X of the Texas Rules of Evidence governs the admission of con-
tents of writings, recordings and photographs.293 While the bulk of this
article codifies prior Texas law, the new rules are much more liberal than
prior Texas practice.
Texas Rule of Evidence 1003 virtually eliminates the best evidence rule.294
Rule 1003 permits the admission of a duplicate to the same extent as an
original unless a question is raised as to the authenticity of the original or it
would be unfair to admit the duplicate in lieu of the original. 295 The effect of
this rule is that the best evidence rule now will apply primarily only to oral
282. 679 S.W.2d 668, 670 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1984, no writ).
283. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 3731a (Vernon Supp. 1986) (repealed as to civil
actions 1983).
284. Id.
285. TEX. R. EvID. 902(1).
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 3731(a), § 4 (Vernon Supp. 1986) (repealed as to
civil actions 1983).
289. 686 S.W.2d 203 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, no writ).
290. Id. at 205-10.
291. Id.
292. Id. at 205.





testimony attempting to characterize or summarize matters contained in
writings, recordings, or photographs.
Mercer v. Daoran Corp.2 9 6 is a pre-rules case that would have been decided
differently had Texas Rule of Evidence 1003 been in effect at time of trial.
The Texas Supreme Court in Mercer reversed a summary judgment entered
in favor of a purchaser at a trustee's sale on the grounds that the original
promissory note had not been produced and no explanation was forthcoming
for the failure to produce the original. 297 The Texas Supreme Court ex-
plained that if the original writing is not produced or its nonproduction is
unaccounted for, evidence of its contents is inadmissible.298
During the survey period the Amarillo court of appeals held that the Na-
tional Electric Safety Code was inadmissible to establish a standard of care
in Pate v. Texline Feed Mills, Inc.299 The court ruled that the Code does not
have the force of law and represents only the conflicting views of its
compilers. 3°°
In US. Fire Insurance Co. v. Twin City Concrete, Inc.30 1 the appellant
complained that the trial court erred in excluding copies of its insurance
documents, including a draft and a loss draft acceptance authority. The ap-
pellant claimed that a portion of the bond application that provided that
copies of drafts or other evidences of the appellant's payment would be
prima facie evidence of the appellant's liability in a suit between the appel-
lant and the appellee. In affirming the trial court's exclusion of this evi-
dence, a Houston court of appeals explained that the agreement defining
prima facie evidence cannot alter the categories of admissible and inadmissi-
ble evidence. 30 2 Because the copies of the draft and the loss draft acceptance
authority did not show payment, they could not be admitted to prove
payment. 30 3
Photographs3°4 that portray relevant facts or facts in issue are admissible
if they are identified by a witness as accurately representing those facts. 30 5
The authenticating witness need not be the photographer, nor is it necessary
that the witness be present at the photograph's taking or have any knowl-
edge regarding the taking of the photographs. 30 6 The witness must testify
that he knows the scene or object in question and that the photograph accu-
296. 676 S.W.2d 580 (Tex. 1984).
297. Id. at 584.
298. Id. at 583.
299. 689 S.W.2d 238 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
300. Id. at 245.
301. 684 S.W.2d 171 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ).
302. Id. at 174.
303. Id.
304. " 'Photographs' include still photographs, X-ray films, video tapes, and motion pic-
tures." TEX. R. EvID. 1001(2).
305. See generally 2 R. RAY, supra note 44, § 1466 (photograph must be verified by witness
before admissible in evidence).
306. See, e.g., Vardilos v. Reid, 320 S.W.2d 419, 423 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1959, no
writ); 2 R. RAY, supra note 44, § 1466.
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rately reflects it.30 7 Once this predicate is laid, the photograph is
admissible. 308
A change in the scene or object photographed does not preclude the pho-
tograph's admission if the changes are explained so that the photograph will
help the jury understand the nature of the condition at the relevant time.30 9
Nor does the length of time between the incident in question and the taking
of the photograph preclude admission if the photograph is identified as an
accurate depiction of conditions at the relevant time.31 0  These questions
were recently considered in Cheek v. Zalta.3 1  Cheek was a consumer's ac-
tion alleging misrepresentations that an older boat sold by the defendant to
the plaintiff was a new, unused 1978 model. At issue was whether the trial
court erred in admitting into evidence a September 1982 photograph of the
boat that had been delivered to the plaintiff in April 1979. An independent
boat appraiser and expert witness testified that he took the photographs of
the boat in 1982 and that they truly and accurately represented the boat at
that time. He also testified that the purpose of his appraisal and testimony
was to demonstrate that the identification numbers on the boat's hull had
been altered. The appraiser's testimony established that he could discern the
original number, which indicated 1975 as the date of manufacture, but that
the number had been changed to show the boat was manufactured in 1978.
The Houston court of appeals affirmed the admission of the photographs
into evidence. 31 2
A dispute as to the accuracy of some part of the photograph does not
render it inadmissible, but goes to the weight of the evidence and presents a
fact question for the jury.313 The trial court has broad discretion in ruling
on the admissibility of photographs, and only an abuse of discretion will
cause a reversal of the trial court's ruling.314 The jury is the sole judge of the
degree of weight given to a photograph once it is admitted.31 5 In Cheek the
testimony of the store manager from whom the appellant purchased the boat
307. See McRoy v. Riverlake Country Club, Inc., 426 S.W.2d 299, 305 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Dallas 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.); 2 R. RAY, supra note 44, § 1466.
308. In most cases the best evidence rule, now codified in TEX. R. EVID. 1002, does not
apply to photographs because they are usually admitted as demonstrative evidence to illustrate
the authenticating witness's testimony, not as primary evidence to prove their content. See
FED. R. EVID. 1002 advisory committee notes. The best evidence rule applies when the con-
tents of a photograph are sought to be proved; for example, a copyright, defamation, or inva-
sion of privacy suit, or where the photograph has independent probative value, such as an
automatic photograph of an alleged bank robber. Id. Note, however, that an "original" of a
photograph includes the negative or any print therefrom. TEX. R. EvID. 1001(3).
309. Howell v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R., 380 S.W.2d 842, 844 (Tex. Civ. App.-East-
land 1964, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
310. Meehan v. Pickett, 463 S.W.2d 481, 483 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1971, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
311. 693 S.W.2d 632 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, no writ).
312. Id. at 635-36.
313. See 2 R. RAY, supra note 44, § 1466; see also Briones v. Levine's Dep't Store, Inc., 435
S.W.2d 876, 882 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1968), aff'd, 446 S.W.2d 7 (Tex. 1969).
314. Lilly v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 584 S.W.2d 720, 724 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1979,
no writ); Briones v. Levine's Dep't Store, Inc., 435 S.W.2d 876, 882 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin
1968), affd, 446 S.W.2d 7 (Tex. 1969).
315. 435 S.W.2d at 880.
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conflicted with the testimony of the appraiser who identified the photograph
as to the date of manufacture.31 6 The court ruled that this conflict did not
preclude the admission of the photographs. The court did rule, however,
that the conflict presented a question for the jury as to the weight to be
accorded to the photographs.317
XI. PAROL EVIDENCE
The parol evidence rule proscribes the use of extrinsic evidence to inter-
pret a writing in some circumstances. 31 8 The court may allow extrinsic evi-
dence only if it finds a c ontract to be ambiguous. 31 9 The rule also prohibits
parol evidence if a contract is integrated. 320
During the survey period, the appellate courts of Texas rejected attempt
to introduce parol evidence on varied and ingenious grounds. The Texas
courts of appeals refused to allow evidence of a memorandum of lease of-
fered to interpret an unambiguous lease, 32' parol evidence as to the intent of
the parties in reserving a royalty interest when both parties agreed that the
deed was unambiguous, 322 and evidence of custom and usage of course of
dealing to contradict the express terms of unambiguous invoices which
clearly indicated the seller's risks and responsibilities. 323 Also excluded was
evidence of the intent of the parties regarding indemnification when the obli-
gation to protect the indemnitee against the consequences of its own negli-
gence was expressed in clear and unequivocal language in a contract, 324
evidence of additional consideration not mentioned in releases that were
found to be unambiguous, 325 and evidence of an alleged oral agreement to
repurchase real estate when none of the complete and unambiguous docu-
ments regarding the subject transactions suggested that a prior or contempo-
raneous repurchase agreement existed. 326 A court rejected parol evidence
that an assignment provision was really a right of first refusal in a complete,
316. Cheek, 693 S.W.2d at 635-36.
317. Id. at 636.
318. See 2 R. RAY, supra note 44, § 1601, at 310.
319. See Sun Oil Co. v. Madeley, 626 S.W.2d 726, 732 (Tex. 1981) (construction of unam-
biguous oil and gas lease).
320. Intergration is the practice of embodying a transaction into a final written agreement
that is intended to incorporate in its terms the entire transaction. See 2 R. RAY, supra note 44,
§ 1602, at 312-14.
321. Walker v. Horine, 695 S.W.2d 572, 577 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1985, no writ).
322. Averyt v. Grande, Inc., 686 S.W.2d 632, 634 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1984, writ
granted).
323. Liberty Enters. v. Moore Transp. Co., 679 S.W.2d 779, 785 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth
1984), rev'd on other grounds, 690 S.W.2d 570 (Tex. 1985).
324. Channel 20, Inc. v. World Wide Tower Servs., 596 F. Supp. 928, 930 (S.D. Tex. 1984).
325. Jeanes v. Hamby, 685 S.W.2d 695, 698 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
326. Young v. Simpson, 607 F. Supp. 67, 70 (S.D. Tex. 1985); cf. Commerce Say. Ass'n v.
S.C. Management 108, Ltd., 681 S.W.2d 200 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, writ
ref'd n.r.e.), in which the court held that evidence of an oral agreement was admissible under
the parol evidence rule because it was offered to establish the existence of a separate accord
and satisfaction and not to vary the terms of the written earnest money contract. Id. at 202.
The oral evidence concerned an agreement between the debtor and realtor whereby the debtor
was to obtain a purchaser for property in return for a release from liability from the realtor
under a real estate note and guaranty.
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unambiguous written instrument. 327
Several appellate courts during the survey period admitted parol evidence
under varying circumstances. For example, one court allowed parol evi-
dence to show whether the agent-employee, principal-employer or both were
liable on a nonnegotiable note when the note disclosed the principal but did
not show the capacity in which the employee signed and contained language
consistent with the liability of agent as well as that of the principal.3 28 An-
other court permitted parol evidence to determine the parties' meaning of
the term "water well" in a contract for sale of a water well, when the court
found the term to be susceptible of different interpretations.3 29 Courts also
admitted parol evidence regarding the intention of the parties' use of the
term "includes" in a joint venture agreement, when the court found the con-
tract ambiguous, 330 and permitted evidence of an oral agreement that a
broker would first attempt to collect his commission from the purchaser and,
if the purchaser would not pay, the obligation to pay reverted back to ven-
dor, when the listing agreement was held to be ambiguous. 33' One court
admitted parol evidence to explain the true intentions of the parties concern-
ing a contractual agreement incorporated into a divorce decree. The divorce
decree stated that the wife was to receive certain real property "subject to
the indebtedness thereon." The trial court received extrinsic evidence be-
cause the extrinsic evidence did not vary or contravene the language of the
divorce decree, but rather clarified and explained the essential agreement
contemplated by the parties by identifying the particular indebtedness to be
assured.3 3 2
Because the parol evidence rule proscribes the use of extrinsic evidence to
interpret only unambiguous intergrated writings, the parol evidence rule will
not always apply. For example, during the survey period the parol evidence
rule was held not to apply to an incomplete instrument, namely one in which
matters were not included or for which the instrument did not provide.3 33 If
the instrument in question appears to be partial or incomplete, then it may
be supplemented by proof of other oral or written terms outside the agree-
ment. 33 4 In such a situation, parol evidence was held to be admissible to
determine the agreement to sell real property where the agreement was writ-
ten by hand on the back of a cashier's check and when the handwriting was
327. Palmer v. Liles, 677 S.W.2d 661, 665-66 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, writ
refd n.r.e.).
328. Byrd v. Southwest Mutli-Copy, Inc., 693 S.W.2d 704, 706 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1985, no writ); see A. Duda & Sons, Inc. v. Mandera, 687 S.W.2d 83, 85 (Tex. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, no writ) (allowing extrinsic evidence to show that parties agreed or
otherwise understood that signer of promissory note would not be personally liable).
329. Exxon Corp. v. Bell, 695 S.W.2d 788, 790 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1985, no writ).
330. Great Nat'l Corp. v. Campbell, 687 S.W.2d 450, 451-52 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
331. Jauregui v. Jones, 695 S.W.2d 258, 263 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, writ refd
n.r.e.).
332. Patterson v. Patterson, 679 S.W.2d 621, 625 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1984, no writ).
333. Bob Robertson, Inc. v. Webster, 679 S.W.2d 683, 688 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st




not intended as a complete embodiment of the agreement between the par-
ties. 335 The parol evidence rule also does not apply to evidence introduced
for purposes other than varying the rights or liability defined by the terms of
a writing; for example, in the case where a creditor is sued on the underlying
loan obligations and not on the promissory note.3 36
The parol evidence rule does not preclude evidence of fraud in the induce-
ment. 337 In Weitzel v. Barnes338 the Texas Supreme Court held that the
exclusion of parol evidence of fraud in the inducement is reversible error in a
Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA)339 case when a written contract ex-
ists. 340 Weitzel is the first case in which the Texas Supreme Court addressed
the question of the admissibility of oral representations in a DTPA case
when a written contract exists. The Supreme Court reversed the court of
appeals' holding that the purchasers waived their contractual inspection and
repair rights because of the failure to have their home inspected within
twenty days from the effective date of the contract. 34' The supreme court
explained that the oral misrepresentations, which were made both before
and after the execution of the agreement, constituted the basis of the cause of
action. 342 The supreme court writing held that even under a contract al-
lowing inspection an affirmative misrepresentation is actionable under the
DTPA.343 The court further explained that the court of appeals erred by
reading into the DTPA a requirement of proof of reliance on the misrepre-
sentation as a prerequisite to recovery. 344
335. Garner v. Redeaux, 678 S.W.2d 124, 128-29 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
336. National Mar-Kit, Inc. v. Forrest, 687 S.W.2d 457, 459 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1985, no writ).
337. Baker v. Missouri Pac. Truck Lines, Inc., 616 S.W.2d 389, 393 (Tex. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 1985, no writ).
338. 691 S.W.2d 598 (Tex. 1985).
339. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.41-.63 (Vernon Supp. 1986).
340. 691 S.W.2d at 600.
341. Barnes v. Weitzel, 678 S.W.2d 747, 750 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1984), rev'd, 691
S.W.2d 598 (Tex. 1985).
342. 691 S.W.2d at 600.
343. Id. at 601.
344. Id. at 600.
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